For decades, Europe has relied on the United States to keep its borders safe. NATO, born in 1949, was never meant to be a permanent fixture-it was a temporary shield against a clear threat. But when that threat faded, Europe didn’t build its own shield. It kept leaning on the American one. Now, with Washington pulling back, shifting priorities, and questioning its commitments, Europe is being forced to ask: Can we defend ourselves?
The illusion of security
Europe spends more on defense than China, Russia, or India combined-but it doesn’t act like it. In 2024, EU member states spent $365 billion on defense. That sounds impressive until you realize only five countries met the NATO target of spending 2% of GDP. Germany, Europe’s economic engine, spent 1.6%. France, often seen as the continent’s military leader, spent 2.1%. The rest? Barely above 1.3%. Meanwhile, the U.S. spent $886 billion, nearly triple the entire EU total.
It’s not just about money. It’s about readiness. In 2023, the European Defence Agency found that only 14% of EU military equipment was fully operational. Tank fleets were half-full. Fighter jets sat grounded for lack of spare parts. Troops trained for peacekeeping, not high-intensity war. When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe scrambled to send weapons it didn’t have enough of. It took months to move even basic artillery to the front. That wasn’t a failure of will-it was a failure of structure.
The U.S. is changing
The assumption that America will always be there is crumbling. The Trump administration openly questioned NATO’s value. It demanded Europe pay more, threatened to withdraw troops, and suggested the U.S. might not defend every member. Even under Biden, the message has shifted. The U.S. is now focused on China. Its military spending is being redirected to the Pacific. Its political energy is tied up in domestic gridlock. In 2025, the U.S. Defense Department quietly reduced its troop presence in Germany by 15%-the largest pullback since the Cold War.
Europe’s leaders still talk about the transatlantic bond. But behind closed doors, they’re making contingency plans. Poland is buying F-35s not just to replace old jets-but to reduce reliance on U.S. logistics. Sweden and Finland, once neutral, are now fully inside NATO, not because they trust America more, but because they don’t trust Russia-and they know they can’t count on Washington to respond fast enough.
The EU’s half-measures
Europe has tried to fix this. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) launched in 2017 with 47 defense projects. So far, 23 are still in planning. Only three have reached full operational status. The European Defence Fund, meant to pool billions for joint weapons development, has funded mostly small-scale upgrades-better body armor, upgraded radios. Not tanks. Not fighter jets. Not aircraft carriers.
There’s no unified command. No shared intelligence hub that works across all 27 member states. Germany refuses to let France lead a joint force. Italy won’t commit to joint procurement unless it gets a say in where factories are built. Spain wants to keep its own navy. Austria won’t join any offensive mission. The EU’s defense policy is a patchwork of national interests stitched together with press releases.
Compare that to China’s military modernization. In 15 years, China built a blue-water navy, a space-based surveillance network, and a hypersonic missile force-all under one command, one budget, one strategy. Europe can’t even agree on how many drones to buy.
What sovereignty really means
Sovereign security isn’t just about having your own weapons. It’s about having your own decision-making. Can Europe decide to send troops into the Balkans without waiting for Washington’s green light? Can it respond to a cyberattack on its power grid without asking for U.S. intelligence? Can it build its own satellite network without relying on American GPS?
Right now, the answer is no. Europe still depends on U.S. satellites for targeting. It uses U.S. communication systems. It relies on U.S. air refueling for long-range missions. It buys ammunition from U.S. factories because its own production lines are too slow. Even its missile defense systems are built on American radar tech. This isn’t partnership-it’s dependency.
True sovereignty means control over the entire chain: design, production, logistics, command, and deployment. The EU’s current model doesn’t even come close. The only country with real autonomy is France-with its own nuclear deterrent, its own aircraft carrier, its own satellite network, and its own independent foreign policy. But France can’t do it alone. Not against a resurgent Russia. Not in a world where China is building military alliances across Africa and the Middle East.
The path forward
There’s no magic fix. But there are steps that could work-if Europe actually commits to them.
- Build a unified defense industry. Stop letting each country buy its own tanks, jets, and ships. Create a single EU procurement agency that forces standardization. Germany and France already did this with the Future Combat Air System. Scale it to everything.
- Create a real EU military command. Not a committee. Not a task force. A true headquarters with authority to deploy troops, manage logistics, and coordinate operations without needing 27 approvals.
- Invest in strategic autonomy. Fund European alternatives to U.S. tech: Galileo instead of GPS, EDRS for satellite comms, Ariane rockets instead of SpaceX. Build domestic production for critical munitions-artillery shells, drones, missile interceptors.
- Link defense spending to performance. Tie EU funding to actual readiness. Countries that spend 2% but keep 30% of their tanks broken? Get less money. Countries that train, share intel, and deploy on time? Get bonuses.
Some of this is already happening. The European Peace Facility has sent over €10 billion to Ukraine since 2022. The EU’s Rapid Deployment Capacity aims to have 5,000 troops ready to deploy in 30 days by 2025. But these are still small, reactive moves. They’re not a system. They’re Band-Aids on a broken spine.
The real test
The moment Europe’s sovereignty is truly tested won’t come in a slow-burn crisis. It will come in a sudden attack-on the Baltics, on Poland, on the Mediterranean. When the sirens go off, and the U.S. is still deciding whether to respond, will Europe be able to act on its own?
Right now, the answer is uncertain. The tools are scattered. The will is fragmented. The leadership is divided. But the clock is ticking. The U.S. won’t vanish overnight. But it won’t be there forever either. Europe has a decade to build a real defense architecture-or spend the next century asking for help.
What’s at stake
This isn’t just about tanks and missiles. It’s about identity. If Europe can’t defend itself, it remains a geopolitical child-dependent, reactive, and always listening for permission. If it can, it becomes a true global actor. One that shapes the rules, not just follows them.
The U.S. built NATO to protect Europe. But Europe’s future doesn’t lie in being protected. It lies in being capable. And capability doesn’t come from speeches. It comes from steel, strategy, and stubborn unity.
Can the EU really build its own defense system without the U.S.?
Yes-but only if it stops treating defense like a charity project. The EU has the money, the technology, and the industrial base. What it lacks is political will. It needs to stop letting national interests block joint projects, stop buying incompatible gear from 27 different suppliers, and create a single command that can actually deploy forces fast. France and Germany have shown it’s possible with joint fighter and tank programs. Now, they need to scale it across the board.
Why hasn’t the EU created a unified army yet?
Because no country wants to give up control. National militaries are tied to national identity. Germany fears French dominance. Poland distrusts Brussels. Italy wants its own navy. Austria refuses offensive missions. These aren’t just policy disagreements-they’re deep cultural and historical divides. A unified army would require surrendering sovereignty over troop deployment, training, and even uniforms. No EU member is ready to do that-not yet.
Is NATO still relevant if Europe builds its own defense?
Yes-but its role changes. NATO won’t disappear. It will become a backup, not the main shield. Europe’s own defense system would handle day-to-day threats and regional crises. NATO would step in only during a major attack, like a Russian invasion of the Baltics. The U.S. would still provide intelligence, air power, and nuclear deterrence. But Europe would lead the response. That’s the future NATO should be heading toward: a partnership, not a dependency.
How does defense spending in Europe compare to the U.S.?
In 2024, the EU spent $365 billion on defense, while the U.S. spent $886 billion. But the real difference isn’t the total-it’s the efficiency. The U.S. spends 3.5% of GDP on defense. Europe averages 1.7%. More importantly, the U.S. has a single defense industry that produces standardized equipment, shares logistics, and operates under one command. Europe’s spending is spread across 27 countries, each with its own systems, making interoperability nearly impossible.
What’s the biggest obstacle to EU defense integration?
The biggest obstacle isn’t money or technology-it’s politics. National leaders still see defense as a symbol of sovereignty, not a shared responsibility. Until countries stop treating military procurement as a jobs program and start treating it as a strategic necessity, progress will stall. The EU can build the tools. But it needs leaders who are willing to give up control to gain real power.
